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Abstract
By way of a commentary on Willem Schinkel’s ‘Against “immigrant integration”: For
an end to neocolonial knowledge production’ in this volume, I propose twelve
propositions in order to rethink the academic use of the concept “integration” in
contemporary migration studies. The notion of “immigration integration” is deeply
embedded in a methodological nationalism found throughout mainstream research
and policy making on “immigration” that reproduces a colonial, nation-state centred
vision of society sustained by global inequalities. The article broadly shares Schinkel’s
arguments, while suggesting specific operationalisations which could advance a
more autonomous social scientific understanding of how the categorisation of
international migration and mobilities is used by nation-states to sustain particular
orders and hierarchies of social power.
Keywords: Integration, Assimilation, Immigration, Immigrants, Methodological
nationalism
It is not difficult for me to write a commentary on Schinkel’s text ‘Against “immigrant
integration”’ (Schinkel, 2018). Although I might quibble about some of the philosoph-
ical stylisms, I basically agree with his arguments. As I have written in response to his
brilliant 2017 work (Schinkel, 2017; see also Schinkel, 2013), Imagined Societies: A
Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe: “Mainstream approaches to im-
migration continue to blindly reproduce the language and logic of nationalist politics—
especially with the notion of immigrant “integration”, a hugely problematic concept
that that has barely ever been examined critically. Referring to, but ranging well be-
yond, the crucial case of the Netherlands, Willem Schinkel’s trenchant book lays out
new avenues of critical thought in migration studies, which expose the mechanics, as-
sumptions and damaging cooption involved in far too much policy related social sci-
ence in this field.” The challenge here is how to move this agenda out of the somewhat
comfortable terrain of critical race and whiteness studies—and their allied fields in crit-
ical theory, feminist theory and so on—into the heartland of applied comparative em-
pirical work.
The deconstruction of the mainstream on its own terms will be no easy task. Partly
because alternate critical approaches have found their own safe spaces, networks and
career paths in academia, I have little faith in the long run exposure of the “theoretical
hiccup” Schinkel dissects. Academics across epistemologies simply don’t talk to each
other—because they have no need to. Meanwhile “multiculturealism”, as he describes
it—basically a reactionary, neoconservative nationalism—has everywhere in Europe
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triumphed as a default common sense: in the UK it is personified in the massive,
best-selling impact of Collier (2013) and Goodhart (2013). And this populist triumph is
abetted as Schinkel also pungently reveals, by a much more serious and worthy com-
parative social science of immigrant integration, that reacts with anger and dismissal
when its own non-reflexive, methodological nationalist assumptions and implications
are exposed (Alba & Foner, 2016, responding to Favell, 2016, a critique of Alba &
Foner, 2015).
But we get nowhere in social science without operationalisation. And so my contribu-
tion here is to try to work through a stepwise rationale of operationalisation that might
take us some way towards the de-colonial social science that Schinkel evokes, but
which is not necessarily best served by the most powerful versions of critical migration
studies on offer. One might say: after Schinkel, or indeed after many of the various crit-
ical writings in a similar post-Marxist/Foucauldian and/or de-colonial vein, such as An-
derson (2013), de Genova (2010), Mezzadra and Neilson (2013), or McNevin (2011)…
What then? As with Schinkel, I would assume as a starting point a familiarity with the
state-of-the-art mainstream comparative work, Strangers No More: Immigration and the
Challenges of Integration in North America and Western Europe, by Alba and Foner
(2015).
1. The move from assimilation to integration (as in Alba and Foner) is a retro-
gressive and ingenuous one—it solves nothing. Most seriously operationalised in-
tegration measures are in fact assimilation measures. The other main type are
dissimilarity indexes. The terms are interchangeable. Whether you call it “assimi-
lation” or “integration”, the fundamental question—integration of whom into
what?—is not resolved. Research is torn between models of statistical “mainstreams”
and constructed categorical “race” comparator groups. The mainstreaming (“colour-blind”)
model is ascendent in European research influenced by dominant North American models
(Alba & Foner, 2015; Alba & Nee, 2003); in the US, race-based (segmented) assimilation is
still more accentuated (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993). British integration /
race inequalities research is a peculiar hybrid (Demireva & Heath, 2017; Heath & Cheung,
2007; Khan, Finney, & Lymperopoulou, 2014; Modood et al., 1997); hybridity is also evident
in recent French and Dutch work (Crul, 2015; Kesler & Safi, 2011; Safi & Simon, 2013).
2. Integration is a concept not a metaphor. Metaphorical uses should not be ac-
ceptable in operational sociological work. If its “insertion” or “inclusion” or
“adaptation”—and you want less theoretical baggage (or indeed to simply practice
atheoretical descriptive social statistics)—then please call it “insertion” or “inclu-
sion” or “adaptation”, not “integration”. Many uses of the term “integration” among
mainstream sociologists – an example being describing convergent rates of employ-
ment of a white majority group and immigrant minority ethnic groups as “economic in-
tegration” (as in Demireva & Heath, 2017) – are strictly atheoretical. At some point,
though, we do need a theory of society if we want to actually do sociology as opposed
to social statistics (as any German sociologist will tell you). Integration is a full blown
theoretical concept. And it is a Durkheimian functionalist concept, so it cannot be
meaningfully used outside of this kind of theoretical machinery. Integration implies a
bounded system (differentiating itself from its environment); internal differentiation
(i.e., division of labour); order (equilibrium) and abstracted values, specific (and differ-
entiated) to that system; internal, progressive, organic complexity, leading to increased
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differentiation of the individual, as an autonomous subject. Basically, it is (just) mod-
ernisation theory. If Luhmann (as Schinkel proposes) is too much of a headache, think
Meyer (2010). It follows also that it is meaningless to suggested “integration” is a prop-
erty of any one individual; as in: “this immigrant is more or less integrated”. Integration
is a property of a social system. Its smallest possible variant is a system of two individ-
uals interacting. Integration, in the classic Durkheimian frame, is what produces the
(free) individual.
3. If it is used at all “integration” now today would have to be global (or better:
planetary) integration. The idea of national integration is an absurd anachronism.
It is amazing that we still have to say this in the social sciences. Have the global studies of
the last 25 years taught us nothing in “immigration studies”? Did nothing “international”
happen in the twentieth century? Did the complex world systems of industrialisation and
colonialism not happen? Historians will all tell us that “national integration” never really
happened as it was “imagined”; and if it did it was only ever in the context of (global) in-
dustrialisation and colonial exploitation. Economic, cultural, social “integration” at the
bounded national level evidently is a conceptual nonsense. The illusion of self-defining
nation-state societies is today only sustained because of American hegemony: the last con-
tainer nation-state, the archetype on which all other nation-state societies consciously or
not project their identities. Residual national integrationist thinking is driven by the theory
of American society: a curiously Parsonian residue in contemporary sociology. Notwith-
standing, in Europe, national integration is blatantly a fantasy of late nineteenth century
nationalism, at best only conceivable as a certain illusory image of the container national
(Marshallian) welfare state of the 1950s. It was in the case of Britain and France a
“post-colonial” fantasy – of withdrawing back into a Wilsonian national territorial state
which never existed – because above all these “nations” were – and still are to some ex-
tent – “empires”. Clearly the modern world system in a Wallersteinian sense is very far
from integrated, but there are aspects of integration we can talk about in terms of region-
alism, international organisations, international political economy, transnational networks,
institutional isomorphism, cultural globalisation, ongoing colonial formations, etc. That’s
just global studies, business as usual. But it is more than a little bit bizarre that migration
studies—the study of human spatial mobilities in a global context—has no central place in
this, because of how it is dominantly practiced—as a nation-state-centered obsession with
immigrants, national politics and national integration. Of course, this is the standard
transnationalist position on methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick, 2002). But
what Wimmer and Glick Schiller neglected, and which has been sorely lacking, is further
critical work on the master concept of societal integration. This was work begun in the
late 1990s by Bommes (1998, 2012), and which I attempted to re-frame reflexively in the
post-doctoral phase of my early work (from Favell, 1998 to Favell, 2001, 2003). One might
also trace the theoretical influences here in Luhmann and Bourdieu, or cite Sayad (1996).
And we now clearly have a lot of works amassing at the fringes of the field, not least
Schinkel’s, which share similar sources (i.e., see also Bauböck, 1994a; Crul & Schneider,
2010; Dahinden, 2016; Fox & Mogilnicka, 2019; Grzymala-Kaslowska & Phillimore, 2017;
Korteweg, 2017; Simon, 2005; Valluvan, 2017; and surveys of integration research and
policy in Scholten, Entzinger, Penninx, & Verbeek, 2015; Simon, Piché, & Amélie, 2015;
and my Favell, 2015, a revision and update of the original 2001 Carnegie report first
presented in 1999).
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4. Any residual talk today of “national integration” – particularly of the integra-
tion of “immigrants” into given “national” societies – is therefore normative not
analytical or empirical sociology. It is not an autonomous “scientific” discourse; it
is a form of thinking-for-the-state. We may also call it “power-knowledge” as Schinkel
says. This mode of thinking focuses attention on the organisation / governance of society,
seeking to re-imagine and represent the reality of global society in terms of a national model
of politics sustained by national institutions and national citizens (you don’t just become an
individual, you become a fully empowered moral/political citizen). In this sense, academic
researchers working with the national integration paradigm are straightforwardly hand-
maidens to a political process; their research, again echoing Schinkel, is obviously a form of
bio-politics (see Tyler, 2010), reflecting everyday political presuppositions (politicians, policy
makers, the media, everyday culture, all reflect this—what I referred to as “public philoso-
phies” in Favell, 1998). Policy oriented “impact” based research has no problem with this
form of knowledge/power (or “policy habitus”, Scholten, Entzinger, Penninx, & Verbeek,
2015 quoting Favell, 2001), but credible, critical “autonomous” academic sociologists should.
Policy academics may argue that their work is feeding into public discourse, knowledge
influencing politics, etc. We do have good examples of “global” and “regional”
power-knowledge: the multilevelled expert governance of the EU or UN are examples. But
the common-sense power of such concepts as “integration”—and the kind of “society” thus
imagined—indicates the re-ascendant political form today, in our post-global era: the
National. The form that this power to represent reality in social scientific terms takes
dominantly is still nakedly one of political sovereignty in the service of the Prince and
Leviathan—basically Hobbesian (cf. Latour, 2006). The justificatory form this dominantly
takes in the modern world is of course “Democracy”. The idea that the People can deter-
mine the Nation as a political unit of governance: impose this representation on inter-
national society. Fundamentally, given global mobilities, this involves the canonical
state-sovereignty constituting act of identifying “nationals” and “foreigners” among popula-
tions within, at, or outside, its borders. Brexit is a nice case study (Favell & Barbulescu,
2018). In the unfinished global society of the 1990s and 2000s, of course, what is striking is
how this notion of the political/democratic became unmoored from other forms and scales
of societal integration – economy, culture, social relations, human geographies, and increas-
ingly all scientific accounts of these global systems. Transnational citizenship / post-national
membership is an entirely unresolved but still vital conundrum (Bauböck, 1994b; Jacobson,
1996; Soysal, 1994); social science today is pedalling backwards in its normative thinking on
this (although see Soysal, 2012).
5. Integration is not always desirable. Truly integrated national societies might
look like North Korea or East Germany under Honecker. Full integration implies
rigidity, conformity, fixed differentiations, and closure. If we want to be normative
with our science, we clearly don’t have a clear normative measure at all of what a
“good” integration looks like, given obvious trades off with freedom/individuality (vrs
free riding etc) on the one hand, and decolonial/Foucauldian critiques of assimilation
into modernity (of “whiteness”) on the other (the Schinkel line). Immigrants may be
subjected to too much integration. Yes, invisibility is generally the endpoint, but that
has little to do with being a national. A lot of celebrations of “successful” integration
are celebrations of class inequalities—how wonderful it is that black people have
attained the modest success of white “national” working classes, etc.
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6. The myth of national integration is of course an alignment of the individual
with the norms (the “mean”) of mainstream society. And the operationalisation
works (up to a point) with aggregates and behavioural measures. But no structural
assimilation (which is all that is) can work without values and culture aligning
too—citizenship proprement dit. This requires cognitive ability, knowledge,
self-awareness, and ultimately proof of one’s autonomy as a moral individual. All
integration tests have involved this kind of material—it is what you can examine an in-
dividual on; on how they have been socialised, and become independent. But of course
once the focus is no longer behavioural it is no longer focusing on a body in space and
time (which may be territorialised), but a mind that is made up of vast lexicon of com-
ponents of thinking, feeling, saying and imagining, that of course are made up of all the
world in some way; even a stereotypical “left behind” white working class UKIP English
voter in Grimsby, Lincolnshire has seen American television (see Aksoy & Robins,
2008 on “banal transnationalism”). The State of course has every interest of penetrating
as far as it can in the psyche—the national is the means to do this, integration is the
way the State thinks.
7. If we were to use integration as a sociological concept, it should rather be a
measurement of the de-differentiation of the “national” by the “foreign” (in the
shape of the foreigner). Immigration policy does the opposite: it is how nation-states
keep themselves apart from the world (Waldinger, 2015). What they call “integration”
in fact is a measure of how successfully they differentiate the national society from its
wider anchorings. An inverted use of dissimilarity indexes here might be a useful way
of getting at the genuinely post-national intuition that lies at the heart of research on
superdiversity (to query for a moment Schinkel’s swift dismissal of this field of work—
which has been led by anthropologists).
8. But: Integration into what? The quintessense of integration would be the con-
struction of the translucent (modern, global) individual: it would (still) be the in-
dividual, the self, the free soul, the person able to be different not the same;
empowerment, individuality, autonomy etc; i.e. (just) centuries of philosophy of
the subject. It is also quite simply the “world citizen” predicated as the outcome of
nearly all national “internationalised” educational policies in developed and developing
countries around the world (Schissler & Soysal, 2005, in the world sociology tradition
of Meyer). The critique of methodological whiteness, of course, comes next. The point
is, though, that that critique has to be empirical one: yes, access to Meyer’s world is ob-
servably differentiated by race, class, gender, culture (ethnicity), disability—all the
standard stuff sociologists write about. In other words, assimilation can and should be
modelled (critically) as assimilation into “whiteness”—into Modernity (as such)—be-
coming a translucent modern individual (although often the same thing in some con-
texts, to avoid the confusion where “white/whiteness” no longer always refers to
skin-colour, I would say “translucent” is the general form modern invisibility now
takes). But this process is of course (empirically) classed, raced, gendered, able-bodied,
etc. My point is that there is an intersection here where (planetary) assimilationist and
(i.e.) critical race studies or Foucauldian readings are compatible (if they differ, it would
be for normative reasons centred on differing understandings of Kantian autonomy and
Foucault’s “What is Enlightenment?”). A well “integrated” modern person is not one
who is attaining norms of working class attainment! How ridiculous. Are you
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“integrated” as soon as you cross a poverty subsisdence line? Attain an average wage?
Become “middle class”? When you are no longer a visible social “problem” (as a group)?
No wonder a lot of scholars (as well as Schinkel) find this offensive (he labels it “ra-
cist”). We agree: national integration imagined and projected with such threshold cri-
teria onto immigrants is of course automatically a form of subordination/domination
vis-à-vis truly translucent modern individuals. Usually national integration not only
compares them to “losers” of this system; it also “groups” them (usually by the concept
of “ethnicity”) so as to prevent or make difficult any individual differentiation. Any kind
of measurement of attainment vis-à-vis a “national mainstream” will inevitably smuggle
in with it “cultural” markers of attainment that are no longer required of translucent
global individuals, who by definition have an à la carte relation to the national cultural
requirements which need to be plebiscited (“democratically”) every day, in the old re-
publican terms of Renan—and which are imposed on newcomers in the society so that
they must prove they belong (i.e., in conditional integration “tests”). The idea here is
that you only become a “neoliberal” subjectivity beyond a certain wage/affluence/educa-
tion criteria. Class and race/immigrant domination are therefore substantially the same
thing. If national acculturation were not à la carte for those who consider themselves
“the free”, modern life would be totally unbearable (the dilemma of Orwellian/Foucaul-
dian governmentality; see Favell, 2018). Of course, some migrants have social trajectories
that take them into the global social classes of modernity; indeed some were already born
into it (there is a small %, even in some very poor countries). Race, gender, culture, dis-
ability cannot account for all disadvantage in the stratified production of “world citizens”.
That in itself is not surprising. But— and this is the key step empirically—it is the prob-
able disadvantage of the low value nationality with which they were born which matters
most, not their lucky global elite status. This is what global inequalities and birthright
scholars theorise in terms of life chances according to national birthright and the index
value of nationality (Kochenov, 2016; Milanovic, 2010; Shachar, 2009).
9. Global inequalities and the birthright lottery make the stark point that re-
gardless of a putative global citizenry (which in any case is mostly derived from
nationality), one’s nationality at birth may account for as much as 80% of life
chances. Race, gender, culture, disability (etc) may have more local or contextual ef-
fects on differentiation, but the big picture of absolute inequalities is always the differ-
ence between being born in the US with American citizenship or being born in
Somalia with Somalian citizenship, regardless of race, gender, culture, disability (etc).
Trump’s policy made this point literally with his Muslim travel ban on eight national-
ities regardless of socio-economic class status. National integration policy is premissed
on the idea that the long and winding road to becoming a successful, “good” UK citizen
is in the end proof that British citizens, born and bred, did indeed win the lottery of
life, and no matter where they were born in the national hierarchy (as they so much like
to think): i.e., it is how it gets them to suspend their judgement on where they fall
within the distribution of UK nationals (as long as they can value their nationality by
knowing that others do not have it). This is perhaps why the popular resistance led by
the likes of Collier and Goodhart is so much against the hollowing out of national citi-
zenship—even as they accept an ever narrowing, ever more governmental, “moral” cri-
teria for who is a “good” citizen and a legitimate part of the national “community of
value” (Anderson, 2013).
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10. Any concern with integration that wants to transcend this naked form of (co-
lonial) nationalism must therefore take as its priority the effect on global inequal-
ities that are structured by inequalities of nationality—integration of immigrants
in the conventional sense basically exacerbates this when it ignores it, or assumes
redistributional benefits beyond the nation-centred model. The point of course is
one from the transnationalism and free movement/development literatures—but it es-
chews the optimistic promoters of second generation transnationalism who tried to
claim that transnationalism was compatible with national integration (Levitt & Glick,
2004; see also similar arguments in Erdal & Oeppen, 2013, Faist, 2008, Snel, Engbersen,
& Leerkes, 2006, Trenz & Triandafyllidou, 2017—all of these works fail to define “inte-
gration” outside of the national paradigm, as well as evacuating integration processes of
the inevitable coercion and domination involved, on both counts reproducing
“methodological nationalism” despite themselves). How could it be compatible? No; be-
cause of global inequalities and the indexical value of nationality, there clearly is a
negative trade off between becoming an nationalised American and being a trans-
national Mexican. That kind of relation can be positive when there is no border. But
when there is a border, as there always is to some extent, and particularly when the
State is engaged in strenghtening the border (hence the valuation of nationals vrs for-
eigners), the relation becomes increasingly negative (cf. Waldinger, 2015). This kind of
question and its change over time can be empirically measured.
11. Bordering processes lie centre stage in the production and reproduction of
global inequalities. When transnationalism is limited, controlled and governed—as it
inevitably is to some degree—then the situation of global inequality is worsened. That
is perhaps obvious from the literature on migration and development. But what is per-
haps less obvious is that the operation of categorising cross-border transactions, and
particular the action of identifying legal and illegal migrants, or distinguishing between
wanted/unwanted migration, and imposing integration on a ever-shrinking number of
recognised “good” immigrants, is itself how the nation resists development for others,
re-producing itself and its colonial relations with the rest of the planet (see also Ander-
son, 2013). It is the point at which the happy mutualist utopia of The Wealth of Nations
is transformed into something else: the mercantillist political economy of global coloni-
alism. It is the very source of the national power of state-making. Increasingly in a glo-
bal and porous world this action of bordering is how state (political) power is
generated from cross-border mobilities, otherwise known (in neo-liberal terms) as the
free movement of capital, goods, services and persons. Here of couse, we enter an inter-
esting debate with (Italian) Marxists who see bordering as a prodution essential to
neo-liberal capitalism rather than/as well as nationalist state power (cf. Mezzadra &
Neilson, 2013; or, also influenced by Agamben, de Genova, 2010).
12. Political power flows from the successful imposition of migration/population
categories on mobilities. It is the heart of sovereignty. The implications of this are
huge. It matters greatly how state bordering processes deal with the multiple kinds of
mobilities found amidst global integration. What difference do the 35 million tourists
annually in London make when they are an unacknowledged part of everyday “na-
tional” society? Or the 3+ million EU nationals in the UK who felt a national border
crossing them on 24 June 2016—as they became, overnight, coercively designated “im-
migrants” in a land where they had been simply “free moving” residents in one part of
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the EU? What difference does it make if migrants crossing are only a small % of all
daily crossings of the Mexican/US border? When “walls” are substantially “smoke and
mirrors”? The State/the People has every interest in governing/classifying/controlling
everything—even if the irregular/informal is always exceeding it. It helps the State
greatly, though, when migration as “immigration” can be separated clearly from the
continuum of these other mobilities. Again, mainstream immigration/integration
scholars are naive co-producers in this production of power and domination. And it is
not a big step to a bigger, second, realisation; that the production of borders internal to
the nation—social distinctions—may also be the heart of political power (of
governance) as such: the democratic governance of race, ethnicity, culture, gender, dis-
ability, even class, through the institutionalised categorical recognition of difference /
inequality—i.e., how the State renders its objects and subjects legible for domination
(cf. Mann, 1986/1993; Scott, 1998). The nation in the end is the organising unit of
democratic political power; its integrating differentiations and its differentiated integra-
tion the mode by which the political produces and concentrates, binds and bounds
power over the societal in an otherwise global/planetary context. These processes enact
in multiple ways “nationalised” spheres of state knowledge production, which reinforce
and reproduce familiar national indexes, hierarchies and stratifications of social power.
This of course opens the path to a much broader, more systematic account: what I
would call the foundational principles of political demography—which underlie political
economy and below which lie the principles of political ecology.
A debate to be continued, I hope.
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